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Abstract
This article presents an edited excerpt from a hitherto unknown
fragmentary treatise by Rush Rhees. In the treatise, Rhees gives his
account of the problem of continuity that he had started elaborating
before he became acquainted with Wittgenstein. The excerpt, which
contains Rhees’ original distinction between outer and inner surfaces of
bodies, builds on Brentano’s theory of the continuum and his doctrine
of plerosis. This treatment of continuity sheds light on Rhees’ early
philosophical development and confirms that even though he and
Wittgenstein discussed the problem of continuity, Rhees’ own approach
remained distinct from that of Wittgenstein.
Introduction
Readers of Rush Rhees’ Discussions of Wittgenstein will remember the
essay “On Continuity: Wittgenstein’s Ideas, 1938.” In the preface to the
book, Rhees describes the origins of the essay:
The essay “On Continuity” has not been printed before and I won-
dered if I should include it. The ideas are Wittgenstein’s, and so are
the chief examples and phrases. The first half says little that cannot be
found in Wittgenstein’s own words in the Remarks on the Foundations of
Mathematics. But it goes with the second half which discusses questions
(“continuity outside mathematics”) on which he did not write after
1930. I had been trying to write on continuity in 1938, and in August
he offered to talk about it with me. For about three weeks we met
every day. Once Francis Skinner was present; no one else was. The dis-
cussions were in the afternoon and they were long (one finished after
seven hours). In the last few of them I took down some things while
he was speaking. In the evenings or next day I wrote down what I had
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understood. I have written from these notes, trying at various points to
work out what he meant.1
In the following, we present an excerpt from what we assume is the
writing on continuity that Rhees mentions in this passage. The excerpt
is from a 77-page typescript found among the papers of Alfred Kastil that
are in the Franz-Brentano-Archives at the University of Graz. The type-
script is divided into two chapters written in well-shaped prose, thus
appearing as the elaborated beginning of a longer treatise. Our excerpt
represents the core of chapter 2.
In chapter 1, Rhees explicates what kind of continuity he will be
concerned with in his investigation. Most importantly, he excludes the
mathematical concept of continuity. His focus, he says, will instead be
on continuity in immediate experience. Thus, the scope of Rhees’
account may be related to the second part of the essay “On Continuity:
Wittgenstein’s Ideas, 1938.” The most striking feature of the excerpt,
however, is how it differs in general from the essay in Discussions of
Wittgenstein. As the excerpt shows, Rhees built on Franz Brentano’s the-
ory of the continuum and his doctrine of plerosis in order to clarify the
then-current philosophical discussion of the problem of continuity. This
ambition in philosophical scholarship stems from a time before Rhees
became acquainted with Wittgenstein, and the theoretical approach dif-
fers from that taken in his discussions with Wittgenstein later on. A note
in a letter to Brian McGuinness, in fact, suggests that Wittgenstein was
not familiar with Brentano’s ideas:
I came to know Wittgenstein after I had known Kraus and studied
Brentano, and I was interested to learn if I could whether Wittgenstein
had read Brentano. I think it is certain that he had not. [. . .] I often
mentioned Brentano’s views to him, and he never showed the slightest
sign that he was acquainted with them. [. . .] And I cannot really find
anything in Wittgenstein which reminds me of Brentano.2
Rhees’ first job after completing his degree in philosophy at the
University of Edinburgh was a temporary teaching post at the University
of Manchester.3 That post expired in 1932. During the subsequent years,
he spent several long periods in Innsbruck studying with Prof. Alfred
Kastil, a former student of Brentano and Anton Marty. Some 15 years
before Rhees first went to Innsbruck, Kastil had been appointed editor of
1. Rhees (1970: vii); underlining by Christian Erbacher. Wittgenstein wrote on ques-
tions connected with “continuity outside mathematics” in his so-called phenomenological
phase in 1929.
2. Letter from Rhees to McGuinness, dated 6 May 1963, kept at the Richard Burton
Archives at the University of Swansea, UNI/SU/PC/1/1/3/5.
3. Cf. Phillips (2006).
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Brentano’s papers. At the time of Rhees’ visit, Kastil was editing the book
Kategorienlehre containing Brentano’s theory of the continuum.4 Rhees
developed a keen interest in Brentano’s views and later even made sugges-
tions for Kastil’s edition. Kastil pointed out that he regarded Rhees as cap-
able of working out Brentano’s fragmentary theory:
The principal aim of his visit, and the one which he chiefly followed,
was to make himself acquainted with the philosophy of Franz Brentano
and with that of the most important of Brentano’s pupils, Anton Marty.
Since then he has deepened his knowledge of these philosophers that
his understanding of their position is not inferior to that of their imme-
diate pupils. [. . .]
He showed at once how well he had developed the fruits of his
study in Innsbruck. He was in a position to suggest many improve-
ments to the latest volume of Brentano’s posthumously published
works, Kategorienlehre, of which I shall make use in a new edition.
Among the problems which stand in the forefront of philosophical
interest today, the problem of the nature of the so-called relations offers
particular difficulties. Brentano in his enquiries pointed out new paths
in this connection, although he did not follow them out completely.
Mr Rhees has undertaken, with a decided probability of success, I
think, to carry the work further in this field. He laid before me the
plan of a theory of relations which we discussed, particularly that part
of it which had to do with the so-called relations of comparison, as we
met one another daily during his summer visit.
At Christmas time and during the past 5 weeks, we have been busy
with the analysis of the relations of continuity. Brentano struggled with
the difficulties of the continuum repeatedly throughout his life and
developed a general theory of continuity, which sets forth the general
laws for continua of various numbers of dimensions. In this connection,
he did not neglect the peculiarities which distinguish topic continua
from chronic continua. But Brentano devoted special study to double
continua, of which motion is the most important example. Here, he
developed the conceptions of teleiosis and of plerosis, the former of
which applies to differences of velocity, the latter to the quantitative
differences in the connections of boundaries. But even in regard to
these relations of continuity, Brentano’s theory remains incomplete;
indeed he indicated to me a few days before his death that his theory
was in a process of alteration, without giving any further indication of
the kind of improvements which he had in mind. It now appears very
probable that Mr Rhees’s acumen and unsparing diligence have suc-
ceded [sic] in finding the proper approach here.5
When Kastil wrote these lines, Rhees was a doctoral student at Cam-
bridge. G. E. Moore was his supervisor and had suggested he attend
Wittgenstein’s classes. Although Rhees followed this advice, he was ini-
4. cf. Brentano (1968).
5. Presumably a letter of recommendation, dated Easter 1935, kept at the Richard Bur-
ton Archives at the University of Swansea, UNI/SU/PC/1/1/2/3.
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tially sceptical about Wittgenstein’s philosophising and wanted to devote
his studies to the philosophy he had learned in Innsbruck. In November
1933, Rhees wrote to Kastil:
I went to Wittgenstein a few times. He very much gives me the
impression of being a straightforward and honest person; however, I
don’t think that I will go to him more often. I did not make this deci-
sion instantly, as Moore seems to be very appreciative of Wittgenstein.
I, in turn, value Moore’s judgment very highly, and I know that he
would not have his opinion without a reason. Nonetheless, I think I
will not go anymore. I find his style of lecturing confusing. He never
prepares – as when he does, his lectures suffer. (I am convinced that he
is no posturer in this, although he is probably mistaken.) He continu-
ously speaks in similes (which are only partly actual examples), and says
about himself that he always thinks in similes. If something does not
become clear, he does not try to give an explanation in simple words
but instead looks for a new simile. This method, though, is in accor-
dance with his philosophical position, according to which the answers
to the most important philosophical questions cannot be given through
propositions or theories, but can only be “shown” by means of similes
“or symbolic forms.” Therefore, he says that he may be the right man
for philosophy. (This is again, I believe, only naivety, not a sign of
vanity.) But this is why his lectures do not show a clear thread. Cur-
rently he lectures on the philosophy of language, particularly on the
idea of meaning. He constantly emphasizes that the matter is excep-
tionally difficult. Sometimes he grabs his head, giving the explanation,
“All this is tremendously difficult, we are in the middle of hell right
now.” And I asked myself if some of the attendees have any clear
impression about philosophy, barring that the whole (quite undefined)
matter is “tremendously difficult.” This I regard as pedagogically bad. I
hear that only after having heard him [Wittgenstein] for a fairly long
time one starts to recognize how much one gets from him. That I am
willing to believe. But life is short; and the question is whether I
would not profit even more if I used the time for something else (e.g.,
for studying Marty’s works). And at the moment, it seems to me that
this question has to be answered in the affirmative.6
Although Rhees later changed his mind and regularly participated in
Wittgenstein’s lectures, he continued working, in Brentano’s vein, on
the problem of continuity.7 In 1936, however, Rhees abandoned his
plan to finish a dissertation. He once more visited Kastil and then substi-
tuted for his former professor at the University of Manchester, teaching a
wide range of topics in philosophy. Wittgenstein travelled back and forth
between Vienna, Cambridge and Norway during these years. When he
decided to stay in England and resumed lecturing in spring 1938, Rhees
6. Letter Rhees to Kastil, dated 5 November 1933, kept at the Franz Brentano-Archiv,
Nachlass Alfred Kastil, catalogue number K.1.96.1, inventory number 000.616-000.622;
the original is written in German, translated by Tina Schirmer and Christian Erbacher.
7. Cf. Erbacher (2016).
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was among the hand-picked invitees. This renewed their relationship
and led to a phase of collaboration. Wittgenstein asked Rhees to translate
the book that he planned to publish with Cambridge University Press,
and he invited him to discuss “continuity.” Wittgenstein knew Rhees
was trying to write on this topic and encouraged him:
As you know, I wish you lots of luck with your writing. Just stick to
it; and if possible, sacrifice coherence sometimes. I mean, if you feel
you could just now say something, but it isn’t exactly the thing which
ought to come in this place – rather say it and jump about it a bit than
stick to the “single track” and not get on. That is, if you can do it. If
you can’t jump, just plod on.8
Rhees thought about submitting his writing as an application for a fel-
lowship. Wittgenstein supported this idea, but eventually learned that
Rhees decided against it:
I found your first chapter here and was disappointed that you had not
sent it in. I think it was wrong not to do it and I think you ought still
to do it if there is a chance that it might be overlooked that you’re a
bit late. I have only glanced at a few pages & can’t do more at present,
but I didn’t at all have a bad impression! So why the hell you should
wish to be your own examiner I can’t see.9
We assume that the “first chapter” Wittgenstein is referring to in this
letter is the first chapter of Rhees’ treatise from which our excerpt is
taken. As noted above, the first chapter is concerned with defining the
scope of the study. The second chapter begins with a discussion of posi-
tions by prominent Cambridge scholars, in particular William E. Johnson
(referring to Logic, Johnson 1921–24), Bertrand Russell (referring to
Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, Russell 1919) and Alfred N.
Whitehead (referring to An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural
Knowledge, Whitehead 1919). This sets the stage for Rhees’ own and
contrasting account that builds on Brentano.
The following excerpt is the core of Rhees’ attempt to formulate his orig-
inal idea of integral surfaces of bodies. Although one may notice traces of
Rhees’ encounter with Wittgenstein, the theoretical proposal and the dense,
jargon-free prose show the genuine approach and style of the young Rhees.
The excerpt may, therefore, illuminate Rhees’ early philosophical develop-
ment and his philosophising as being distinct from his discussions with
Wittgenstein. The different vein of the investigation also supports what
Rhees stated in his introduction to “Wittgenstein’s Ideas, 1938,” namely,
8. Letter from Wittgenstein to Rhees, 9 September 1938, cf. Wittgenstein (2012: 281,
letter 230).
9. Letter fromWittgenstein to Rhees, 2October 1938, cf.Wittgenstein (2012: 285, letter 233).
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that they indeed show Wittgenstein’s treatment of the topic. Rhees presents
his own account of continuity in the here-edited excerpt of his treatise.
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Editorial note
The original document of Rhees’ fragmentary treatise consists of 77
pages of typescript divided into two chapters. The chosen excerpt is
from the second chapter, namely the pages 35–66 in Rhees’ own pagina-
tion. On approximately one-third of these pages, there are occasional
handwritten annotations which are underlinings, interlinear notes or
comments in the margins. These annotations were made by Alfred Kastil
and are partly written in short hand. The legible ones are either German
translations of single expressions or, when they appear in the margins of
pages, mainly content-related remarks or sketches.
The here-edited excerpt presents the text typewritten by Rhees.
Every page break in the original document is marked with a vertical bar
(|). The raised numbers to the right of the bar denote the following
page and represent the page numbering Rhees used in the original docu-
ment. We include this page numbering to enable direct referencing of
Rhees’ text. His paragraphs and indented lines have been retained. Pas-
sages are underlined only if they are marked thus in the typewritten text
and can hence be distinctly ascribed to Rhees. The footnotes inserted in
the original document are presented at the bottom of each page of the
edited text using continuous numbers. Very few obvious errors in spel-
ling and punctuation have been corrected; to indicate where corrections
have been made, they are placed in chevrons (‹ ›). Corrections have only
been annotated if they cause a change in semantics.
A complete edition of Rhees’ fragmentary treatise will appear in a
forthcoming book on the editorial work of Wittgenstein’s literary execu-
tors.
Outer and Inner Surfaces of Bodies
Excerpt from a fragmentary treatise by Rush Rhees*
We probably should have no conception of a surface if we did not
have volumes of certain limited sizes given in immediate experience. But
*. Rhees’ treatise fragment is included in the holdings of the Franz Brentano-Archiv,
Institut f€ur Philosophie, Karl-Franzens-Universit€at Graz, Nachlass Alfred Kastil; catalogue
number S.6.24.06, inventory number 016401-01677.
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when we say that volumes are given as of limited sizes we imply that
they are given as having ends. And we may be led to speak about the
end of a body (or its tip, its edge, or its side, or its top or its bottom) in
some given direction from its centre. It may of course be suggested that
when we speak in such connections about the body’s “having” an end
or side it is only the syntactical figure which suggests that the side is a
constituent element of the body; and that every statement which appears
to be about “the side” is really a statement about the whole body and its
relation to its surroundings. But such a view seems to me both unneces-
sary and inadequate. I say that it is unnecessary because it seems to me
that it would be perfectly sensible to speak about “this side or surface of
the body” in referring to a constituent element of it. There are various
considerations which suggest, | 36 at any rate, that we mean by expres-
sions such as “surface”, “edge”, and “beginning” to refer to something
not identical with the whole of what is said to have them.
In the first place, surfaces of bodies do seem to have special characters
of their own and to be continuous wholes of a different sort from the
bodies to which they belong. Surfaces are frequently spoken of as being
continuous in only two dimensions, for instance, and they are compared
in this respect with bodies and volumes which are continuous in three
dimensions. We seem in such cases to be talking about a surface and not
about its three dimensional body. We seem no less clearly to be doing so
when we compare different surfaces with one another.1
Further, when we say that two surfaces in different planes intersect to
form an edge of the body, and that this edge is a line which is one
dimensional, we do not seem to be saying merely something about the
relation of the two surfaces to one another. What we say about the edge
no doubt entails a statement about the relations of the two surfaces. But
we also ascribe positive characters to the edge itself. And in doing so we
imply that it is something, although it would obviously be absurd to sug-
gest that it could be separated from that of which it is the edge.
Again, we may say that the beginning boundary or “beginning end”
of a temporal process has a character as boundary (or end) which is dif-
ferent from that of the ending boundary of the process just because each
is boundary in a different temporal direction; or in other words, just
because the one is the beginning and the other is the end. So that here
once more we ascribe positive characters to ends as such without making
an assertion about the relations between that which has them and | 37
something outside it. There is, I believe, an analogous distinction in
character between opposite sides or outer surfaces of bodies in space,
1. I shall point out later certain other differences between surfaces and bodies as contin-
uous wholes.
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although here the difference is not so striking because it always seems
obvious that the body might be turned about, so that the side which
now bounds in one direction might bound in the opposite one. How-
ever this may be, the distinction between the different temporal bound-
aries seems to me to be plain enough and to be sufficient for the point I
want to make.
What we mean by an end or a boundary or a side, in this sense, can
best be brought out, however, by considerations of the following kind.
Suppose that we are concerned with some particular flat end or side of a
given body. Suppose then that the body be divided through the centre
parallel to the side in question; and then that the half of which this side
is still a side be halved again in the same way, and that the half of this
half which still has that side be halved again, and so on, without an end
to the process of halving the part of which this side is a side. It is clear
that what we mean by “this side” could not possibly be affected by this
series of divisions (on the assumption, of course, that the halving pro-
duces no other changes in the volumes concerned). It is equally clear
that if we take “part” to mean “part which has some volume”, then
there is no part which would be unaffected in the course of an endless
process of divisions of this kind. Consequently it appears that what we
mean by “the side of the body” is not any part of the body in this sense.
Yet we do mean something that is actually given and that would be
unaffected throughout such a division.
It is clear that such a side or surface would always be connected with,
in the sense of being the side of, some part or other. It is not even logi-
cally possible that the side should be separated from any and every part
having any volume. | 38 But there is no part having any particular vol-
ume of which it must be the side or surface; and this amounts to saying
that there is no particular part of which it must be the side. This does
not mean, of course, that the side is the side of a “universal”, or that it
might be the side of any one of a variety of parts which were quite dif-
ferent individuals or which could exist simultaneously in separation from
one another. What it means is that there is no part having any volume
of which it could be said truly, “It would be absurd to speak of this side
without this part”. It is for this reason that the consideration or supposi-
tion of a division of this kind is useful in bringing out what is meant by
side or surface of a body. For the surface or side thus appears as some-
thing which must remain throughout such a division what it essentially
is, namely the side of a body. It is thus clearly given as something essen-
tially relative which cannot without obvious absurdity be thought of as
having a separate existence. And yet the fact that we can think of the
side as something particular and definite without thinking of any definite
© 2016 The Authors Philosophical Investigations Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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volume of which it is essentially the side makes clear the distinction between
the thought of the side and the thought of what is bounded by it.2
Perhaps it will be objected, however, that I have not done enough to
show that anything of the sort which I am supposing to remain unaltered
throughout such a division is ever actually given. Certainly something is
given which is endlessly divisible in the way described. But it may be
said that all that this shows is that such a process of divisions can never
reach a smallest possible volume; and so that the possibility of such an
endless division goes no way to show that anything other than parts hav-
ing volumes is given. | 39
If the objection said no more than this I should reply simply that it
does not explain what can be meant by the st‹a›tement (which I suppose
is admitted to be true) that what we first call the side of the body
remains the same throughout such a process of divisions, no matter how
far the process be carried. But it may be said that we can explain what is
meant by this if we treat the side of a body as an abstractive class of vol-
umes adjoining another body; if, in other words, we give an account of
the boundaries of bodies analogous to that which Whitehead has given
of the boundaries of “events” in his Principles of Natural Knowledge.
Such an account is entirely in terms of relations of extension between
volumes, and does not require anything like the integral surfaces of
which I am speaking.
But even if the application to bodies of Whitehead’s analysis of
“events” were otherwise entirely unobjectionable, I do not think it
would give a satisfactory account of what I have been calling the side of
a body. The most relevant passage3 in Whitehead’s theory starts with the
notions of “intersection” and of “dissection” of events. “Two events ‘in-
tersect’ when they have parts in common. . . Events which do not inter-
sect are said to be ‘separated’. . . A ‘dissection’ of an event is a separated
set such that the set of intersectors of its members is identical with the
set of intersectors of the event.” In terms of these notions he defines
what he means by “junction of events”. “Two events x and y are said to
be ‘joined’ when there is a third event z such that (i) z intersects both x
and y, and (ii) there is a dissection of z of which each member is a part
of x, or of y, or of both”. Junction thus includes intersection, but it also
includes “adjunction”, in which case the | 40 joined events are “sepa-
rated”, i. e., have no parts in common. With the help of adjunction
Whitehead can then define “injunction” as well. “An event x is said to
‘injoin’ an event y when (i) x extends over y, and (ii) there is a third
event z which is separated from x and adjoined to y.”
2. See Brentano, “Vom sinnlichen und noetischen Bewusstsein”, p. 95.
3. Opus cit., p. 102.
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Suppose that in this definition of “injunction” we substitute “body”
for “event”, and suppose that we take x and z to be a red block and a
blue block respectively. Suppose further that the red block and blue
block are in contact with (or adjoin) one another. There is then a part
of the red block which is in contact with the blue block but is not iden-
tical with the whole red block. This part corresponds to what is called
“event y” in Whitehead’s definition, and we might say that the red
block “injoins” this part of itself. If we call this injoined part a, then
there is also a part b that is injoined by a; and also a part c that is
injoined by b, and a part d that is injoined by c, and so on. It is clear
that this relation of injunction is what Russell would call an asymmetrical
transitive relation, so that whatever injoins a part injoins whatever is
injoined by that part. Any series of parts injoined by the red block in its
contact with the blue block thus resembles the series of volumes
involved in the process of divisions of parts nearest the end of a body
which I have described above. But it is important to notice that in the
present account the relation of injoined to injoining parts is not specified
by saying (inter alia) that they are all parts of which this particular side is
a side, but rather by saying that they are all parts which are in contact
with or are adjoined by the blue block.
It might now be said that a series of parts injoined by the red block
in its contact with the blue one form an abstractive class, and that such
an abstractive class defines | 41 anything that can reasonably be meant by
speaking of the side or surface of the body. “The properties of an
abstractive class”, according to Whitehead,4 “secure that its members
form a series in which the predecessors extend over their successors, and
that the extension of the members of the series (as we pass towards the
‘converging end’ comprising the smaller members) diminishes without
limit. . . Any property of the individual events which survives throughout
members of the series as we pass towards the converging end is a prop-
erty belonging to an ideal simplicity which is beyond that of any one
assignable event. . . The series itself is a route of approximation towards
an ideal simplicity of ‘content’.” The series of injoined parts might thus
be regarded as a route of approximation by reference to which we define
that ideal simplicity of content which is what is meant when we speak of
“the side or surface of the red block that is in contact with the blue block.”
It would then be clear that what is spoken of as the side or surface of the
block is really a fiction and not a real constituent element of it.
Now the question whether such an account really does explain what
is meant by the side of a body without assuming that there is anything
4. Opus cit., p. 104.
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not a volume which is a constituent element of the body depends above
all on the question whether what is said in it about “adjunction” is an
adequate account of what we mean by contact of bodies. Adjunction is
defined in terms of intersection and separation. But what can be meant
by “intersection” in the case of two adjoining bodies? If a blue block
adjoins a red block I cannot see any sense in speaking of a third body
which has parts in common both with the blue block and the red block,
and which has no part which is not also a part of the blue block, or of
the red block, or of both. And consequently I do not see how a refer-
ence to intersection can be used to make clear what we mean by the
contact | 42 of the two blocks. It is equally obvious that “separateness”
or “having no parts in common” is not enough for contact, although it
is necessary. And I see no way of saying what is meant by contact or
“adjunction” of the bodies without referring to the side of the red block
and the side of the blue one. The two sides or surfaces must touch. But
if we do put the matter in this way, then our procedure is really the
reverse of a method like Whitehead’s. For according to that method we
must know what is meant by adjunction before we can say what is
meant by a side; whereas what I am maintaining is that in the case of
bodies we must understand what a side is before we can know what is
meant by adjunction or contact. And if I am right it will follow that we
cannot understand what is meant by the “series of injoined parts” with-
out assuming that these parts all have the same side; that the side must
be given if “injunction” is to be possible at all, and that the side cannot
be identified with any “injoined” part of the series. It follows also that
the side or surface cannot be treated as an “ideal simplicity of content”
towards which the series of injoined volumes is a “route of approxima-
tion”. What I mean, and what I think is ordinarily meant, by a side or
surface cannot conceivably be a property of any volume, and it cannot
be the ideal limit of a series of volumes. A side or surface has properties
which volumes do not have, and perhaps there is some sense or other in
which it could be said to have a “simplicity” which volumes do not
have. But it certainly cannot be called “an ideal simplicity of volume”,
or anything similar to it. Further, an ideal simplicity of content towards
which a series of injoined volumes “converged” or “approximated”
would not have that essential characteristic of a side o‹r› surface which
we indicate when we say that it is always a side or surface of something.
It is clear that this does not mean that the side is “injoined” by anything,
since only that can be injoined which has a side or surface. | 43
Perhaps it will be said, however, that there is a sense in which “ad-
junction” of bodies can be defined simply in terms of intersection and
separateness of volumes, even though it is impossible to speak of a third
body as intersecting two separated bodies. It might be said that there is
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always a spatial volume which intersects the volumes of the two adjoined
bodies, and which is such that every part of this volume is a part of the
volume of the one body, or a part of the volume of the other, or of
both. We are thus able, it may be suggested, to give an account of
adjunction of bodies simply in terms of the relations of their volumes to
one another, without the assumption of sides or surfaces in the sense in
which I have been speaking of them. Or perhaps the matter could be
put more clearly by saying that there is a place which intersects the
places of the two bodies, and that there is a dissection of this place such
that each member is a part of the place of the one body, or of the other,
or of both.
If this suggestion removes any difficulties that may be felt about
speaking of intersection in connection with adjoining bodies, it seems to
me to raise new difficulties as to what is meant by the separateness of
adjoining bodies. By definition whatever adjoins anything else is also
separate from it. But if the suggestion of the previous paragraph is right,
then the blue block could not be said to adjoin the red block in any dif-
ferent sense from that in which the blue block plus one third of the red
block could be said to adjoin the other two thirds of the red block. And
of course one could talk about the side of any part within the red block
in exactly the same sense as one can talk about the side of the red block
which is in contact with the blue one. If we do not accept these conse-
quences, – and they seem very strange to me, – then I think we must
give up the attempt to describe contact of bodies simply in terms of rela-
tions of intersection among volumes within the space which they jointly
fill. And I think we must | 44 agree that it is necessary to know what is
meant by the side of the one body and the side of the other before we
can understand what is meant by their contact.
I say that the consequences mentioned seem strange to me partly
because it seems to me that when we speak of two different bodies that
are in contact we are not speaking simply of adjoining areas of the
region which they occupy together. When I say “a match box is in con-
tact with this desk” I do not mean simply “there is a spatial region
adjoining the region occupied by the desk”. I mean, among other things,
that one side of the match box touches the desk top. It may be suggested
that the question of whether that which fills a certain area is a single
body or only a part of one is a question which cannot be decided simply
by reference to relations of continuity; that we say that the match box
and the desk are different bodies because they have a certain mechanical
independence of one another, and not because their adjunction is any
different from the adjunction of parts of a single body. On this point I
shall have something to say later on. My contention at present is not that
we say that the match box and the desk are different bodies because their
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contact is different from the adjunction of parts within any one of them.
I am contending simply that we do regard them as different bodies,
whatever our reasons may be, and that we do mean something by the
contact of different bodies which cannot be expressed simply in terms of
intersecting volumes. For it seems to me that we should not be able to
speak sensibly about distinct bodies at all unless we did recognise that
they have definite sides or outer surfaces in a sense in which their inter-
nal parts do not.
I recognise that I have not said anything which proves this. There
seems to me to be some obvious discontinuity between two bodies in
contact which is not to be found between | 45 the parts of any one
body, or between adjoining regions of an otherwise undifferentiated area.
I hope that my view on the matter may seem more plausible when I
have said what I want to say about “inner surfaces” in distinction from
outer surfaces or sides of bodies. But nothing I shall say on this point
would be conclusive against anyone who denied from the outset any dif-
ference between the contact of different bodies and the adjoining of dif-
ferent regions within a larger space.
The method which I should employ in bringing out the notion of an
inner surface is analogous to that which I have given for the clarification
of the notion of an external surface. And I want to maintain with refer-
ence to inner surfaces as well that they are not fictions useful for express-
ing relations between volumes, but are integral constituents of bodies.
Suppose that we take any body which has two parallel sides, and imagine
it divided into thirds by two divisions, each parallel to one of the sides
in question. Suppose then that we take the central one of these three
parts and divide it similarly into thirds, and so again with the central one
of the three parts of it. We can think of a series of divisions of this sort
as being prolonged without limit. We might speak of such a series as
one which constantly “closed in” towards the “middle” of the original
body. If the series be thought of as unending, then it is clear that at the
middle there is no part having any volume which could not possibly be
affected by such a series of divisions. It is clear also that the middle of
every volume concerned in such a series of divisions would be identically
the same, and that no matter how far the series of divisions be thought
to be carried this middle could not possibly be reached or affected. We
have thus the conception of a middle or midway surface as something
which is not itself a part having volume, but is nevertheless inconceiv-
able except as included in a part having some volume | 46 or other. It
would not be anything at all unless it were a middle or midway surface
of something. But there is no part of any particular volume that must
include it. In other words, there is no part having any volume of which
it could be truly said, “It would be absurd to speak of the middle here
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without this part”. We can thus think of the middle or midway surface
as something particular and definite without thinkin‹g› of a part of any
particular volume in which it is included; and in this way we may be
helped to distinguish the thought of the midway surface from the
thought of anything which includes it, although we cannot think of it
except as included in something or other.
It seems to me plain that the thought of such a midway surface is not
the thought of an “ideal simplicity of content” towards which the series
of volumes concerned could be said to form a “route of approximation”,
or towards which as a limit the series of volumes could be said to “con-
verge”. In the account I have just given the midway surface is not
thought of as a limit of a series at all, and particularly not as the limit of
a series of volumes. And it is not necessary to think of any limit towards
which the series of volumes “converges” in order to have a clear notion
of a midway or inner surface5 included in them.
Such inner surfaces must, I think, be given wherever anything is
given as endlessly divisible in this way. And to say that they are given
implies that they are not fictions useful for expressing certain relations of
volumes to one another, but are integral to what is so divisible. The
recognition of them seems to be indispensable to an analysis of what | 47
is meant by saying that one and the same thing is endlessly divisible in
this way, just because when we think of the series of divisions as pro-
ceeding without limit we do think of something given in what is divided
which cannot possibly be affected by it. In so far the notion of an inner
surface is analogous to that of an outer surface. The important difference
between the two lies in the fact that an inner surface is given as some-
thing which must remain unaltered in the course of a double series of
divisions, by which the divided volume is reduced simultaneously from
both sides. This makes it clear that the surface so given cannot be the
outer edge or surface of any part having volume, and that it is logically
inseparable from some volume or other on each side of it. Only there is,
of course, no specific magnitude of volume from which it is inseparable
in order that it should be the inner surface which it is; which is part of what
is meant by saying that it cannot be affected in its character of an inner sur-
face through an infinite reduction of the volume which encloses it.
Now I want to suggest that outer surfaces are surfaces only of single
and separate bodies, and that no outer surface is found within a single
5. I recognise that the expression “inner surface” is rather barbarous, and that the
expression “outer surface” would in ordinary speech be pleonastic. But an expression such
as “inner plane” seems to be even less suited to my purposes. And I shall use “inner sur-
face” in the hope that what I have said on the subject makes tolerably clear what I am
talking about.
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body. Within a single body there are, I suggest, only inner surfaces.
Now no inner surface can be integral to, or be a surface of any part of a
body without being included in it. In other words, it cannot be a surface
of any part which extends no further than it. And if there are no surfaces
but inner surfaces within a single body, then there is no surface within
the body with which one part of the body might be said to begin and at
which another part of the body might be said to end. An inner surface
cannot be a surface with which a part begins, since it can be only a sur-
face of something which includes it.
This consequence may seem at first sight rather startling; and I will
try to make clearer what it means by considering some objections that may
be raised to it. In the first place | 48 it may be said that we can specify precise
lines of division between parts of a single body, and can speak both truly and
sensibly of parts on opposite sides of these lines which extend just up to them
and no further. If a razor edge be placed across a strip of paper we can speak
about the part to the right of the razor edge and the part to the left of the
razor edge, and we can say that these parts meet at the line which the razor
edge touches. It is only saying the same thing in other words, apparently, if
we say that the one part begins there and the other part ends there (or that
they both begin there or both end there).
In the second place, we may often say truly that one single body is
larger than another, – that one strip of paper, say, is larger than another
strip. And one of the things that this implies is that the larger body con-
tains a part exactly equal to the smaller body. If we take a simple case
such as that of one square piece of paper which is larger than another
square piece of paper, for instance, we seem to be justified in saying that
the larger piece contains a part having exactly the same dimensions as
the smaller piece. And this seems to mean that the larger piece contains
a part which has definite boundaries beyond which it does not extend,
or at which it “ends”.
In the third place it may be said that a single body, such as a piece of
paper, may be split up into a number of discrete parts, each of which has
definite boundaries. No such part need have acquired or lost anything
through its separation from the others. And it seems therefore as though
each part must have existed before the separation as a part having just
the extent and dimensions which it has now. Each part, that is, must have
extended up to what is now its external surface and no further. | 49
Finally it may be suggested that even according to my own account
of inner surfaces there must be a part having some volume on either side
of an inner surface, and the part on the one side cannot be identical with
the volume on the other. This would seem to mean that the surface def-
initely divides one part from another. Must I not, in fact, admit either
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that a part can extend up to an inner surface and no further, or else that
surfaces are fictions and not really to be found within bodies at all?
Such objections might be taken to show that the distinction between
inner and outer surfaces which I have been trying to make is unsound,
and that it can do nothing to clarify the supposed distinction between
continuous parts and bodies in contact. I shall try to show, however, that
in so far as what they say is sound they are not objections to the point I
am trying to make.
I will begin with the last of them. An inner surface cannot without
misleading be said to “have a volume on either side of it” or to be “the
place where two volumes meet”. If a surface is said to be something up
to which two different volumes extend this suggests that the surface itself
is not integral to either of them. And I should agree to call a surface in
this sense a fiction. No doubt we often do speak of surfaces within vol-
umes in this sense. But then “surface” means much the same as “divi-
sion” or “demarcation” or “cut” or “partition”; and these words are all
abstracta which do not stand for any integral element in what is given or
thought of. I have said that an inner surface is inseparable from some
volume or other on each side of it; which I take to be just another way
of saying that it is necessarily included in some volume or other. But this
does not mean that it is “between two volumes” in the sense in which
something not identical with and not a constituent of either of two vol-
umes might be | 50 said to be between them. I say that an inner surface
is something which itself has no volume but is an element in the conti-
nuity of a volume which is on either side of it. If we speak of two vol-
umes, one on either side of it, then evidently an integral surface is
integral either to one of these volumes only or to both. But if it were
integral to one of them only it would not be an inner surface at all, but
rather an outer surface or side. And it would not be anything which
could be suggested by the simultaneous series of reductions of a volume
from both sides which I have described. If it is integral to both volumes,
then there is no volume with an outer surface or side, and there seems
to be hardly any justification for speaking of two volumes. There is no vol-
ume which has this surface as its beginning or its end; for if it did, the surface
would not belong to or be integral to anything in the other direction. For
this reason I prefer to speak of an inner surface as an inner surface of a vol-
ume, and neither as a surface between two volumes nor as a surface which
has “a volume” on the one side and “a volume” on the other.
It may still be said, as in the first of the objections mentioned above,
that if a razor edge were placed across a body we could recognise a sharp
distinction between one part of the body which was to the right of it
and the other part of the body which was to the left of it. And it might
be suggested that the razor edge must fall on a line which is the end of a
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certain inner surface extending at right angles to the outer surface on
which the razor edge is placed. Does not the distinction of the part to
the right of the razor edge and the part to the left of it then imply that
the parts of the body so referred to are respectively parts to the right and
to the left of the inner surface in question? If so then the inner surface
must be said to divide parts which meet at it.
I think it is obvious that the “surface” which is here spoken of as
defined by reference to the position of the razor | 51 edge is really just a
surface in the sense of a “partition”, that is, that it is a fiction of the sort
already noted. And it is necessary to try to see more clearly what the
relation is between statements about such partitions which are said to fall
between different parts of the total volume of a body on the one hand,
and statements about real connections and real boundaries on the other.
I agree of course that when a razor edge is placed across a piece of paper
we speak of “all to the right of the line on which the razor edge falls”
and of “all to the left of the line on which the razor edge falls.” But this
does not imply that in such a case we have to do with two things, one
of which is to the left of the razor edge and the other to the right. And
it cannot be argued that “the part to the right of the razor edge” is
something which ends with a surface there in the sense in which a body
in contact with another body there would do so. It seems to me that the
statement, “There is a surface, defined by reference to the razor edge, at
which one part begins and the other ends” is similar in certain important
respects to statements such as “There is a dissection of the event z of
which each member is a part of x, or of y, or of both”. In each case
what seems to be meant is that a division can be made between such
parts. It is not meant either that there is any actual division or separation
or that there is not. It is conceivable that a division should be made at
any line at which the razor edge might be placed. But this is not to say
that as things are now the razor edge distinguishes what belongs to or is
actually included in some thing from what does not belong to it.
Perhaps it will be said that the razor edge distinguishes at any rate
what would belong to one part from what would belong to another if a
division were actually made there. And it may be argued that it would
be impossible to specify now what would belong to the right hand part
rather than to the left | 52 hand part after such a division unless it were
true now that what is so specified belongs to this part of the body and
not to that part. When we say “this part might actually be divided from
that part” we are speaking of something that is really there in the body
and it is of this that we are saying that it might be separated; and we do
not mean even partially the same by “this part” and “that part”. This is
the same argument as that which I have placed third in the list of objec-
tions cited above.
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Now I agree that we may speak truly of a real part of the body as
extending just as far as the razor edge and no further. I agree also that
we may speak of a part of a single body as identical with what is later
separated, in the sense that what has been separated does not contain any
concrete volume more or any concrete volume less than what was
referred to as that real part. But if when we referred to the part of the
single body as extending just up to the razor edge and no further we had
added, “This is a real part to which nothing on the other side of the
razor edge belongs”, then I think we should have been in danger of mis-
leading. Perhaps we should be justified in saying that nothing on the
other side of the razor edge belongs to it as a part. But we should be
wrong if we suggested that there was a real boundary or surface there at
which anything ended. The distinction of this part from the part on the
other side of the razor edge is in a sense real enough. But it is not a real
distinction in the sense in which a distinction between separate things is
so. The part, while it remains a part of a single body, is not, so to speak,
a thing in itself. By this I do not mean, of course, that it is in any sense
identical with or reducible to anything else. I mean partly what can be
expressed by saying that to say that what is to the right of the razor edge
ends there as a part (in this sense of part of a single body) | 53 implies
that it does not end there as a thing.
If this is so, then there is nothing in this precise distinction of parts
from one another which conflicts with my contention that within a
body there can be only inner surfaces, and that an inner surface can be a
surface only of something which includes it. I said that an inner surface
could for this reason not be said to be a beginning or ending of any-
thing, and that we could not say that within a body there was any sur-
face with which a part of the body began or ended. In this sense of
“being a surface with which something ends” an inner surface could not
be a surface with which a part ended even though a part were said to
extend up to it and not beyond it. In this sense a part does not have any
surface with which it ends, even though it may be said to be definitely
limited in extend.
If this can be accepted, then I think that the remaining objection, the
second of those cited above, can offer no real difficulties. This objection
was to the effect that if there are two square pieces of paper of which
one is larger than the other, then the larger one may be said to contain a
part exactly equal to and of exactly the same dimensions as the smaller
piece; and it was suggested that this means that the larger piece, although
a single body, contains a part having definite boundaries. I agree that it
may be said to contain a part having definite boundaries if this means
nothing more than that it contains a part definitely limited in extent.
But I deny that this implies that it contains a part to which an inner sur-
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face can be said to belong without being included. I think, therefore,
that the fact‹s› which might at first sight be mentioned as objections to
the view I have suggested of the distinction between inner and outer
surfaces are not really inconsistent with it. They would be so only if a
definitely limited part were necessarily also a definitely limited
thing. | 54 But I can see no reason to believe that this is the case, and
there seem to me to be very serious difficulties for any view that were
to maintain that it was.
I introduced this discussion of inner surfaces in connection with my
attempt to show why I believe that what is meant by contact of bodies
cannot be stated simply in terms of intersecting volumes. I said in the
first place that it obviously could not be stated in terms of intersecting
bodies. And I suggested that a statement about intersecting volumes
within the common volume or area which two bodies filled would not
explain what was meant by the separateness of two bodies from one
another. I suggested that if nothing more were meant by the contact of
two bodies than what could be stated in this way, then a blue block
could not be said to “adjoin” a red block in any different sense from that
in which the blue block plus one third of the red block could be said to
adjoin the remaining two thirds of the red block. I said that this conse-
quence was one which I should not like to accept because it seemed to
disregard much of what is ordinarily meant by “being a single body”.
My contentions, that there are important differences between inner and
outer surfaces, and that within a single body there are none but inner
surfaces, were intended to make clearer what I meant by this.
I do not profess to have given any proof that inner surfaces, in the
sense in which I have been using the expression, are actually given in
experience, beyond the appeal to what is meant or implied by saying
that a volume is given as endlessly divisible, or endlessly reducible from
two opposite sides in the way I have described. I do not believe that
anything more than this is required; though I am aware that my own
statement of the analysis of what is so given is woefully obscure and
incomplete. But if I have not made it clear that my analysis of what is so
given is the right one, I hope at any rate that I may have made a little
clearer what it is that I am contending | 55 when I say that we cannot
talk about the side of any part within the red block in exactly the same
sense as we can talk about the side of the red block which is in contact
with the blue one. If I have done this, then I think I may have made a
little clearer what I mean by speaking of integral surfaces altogether. If
so, then it should not be very difficult to show what is meant by integral
lines and integral points. And if I can do this, then I think I can answer
more clearly the question as to whether there is any considerable analogy
between the sense in which a line can be said to contain points which
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make it up on the one hand and the sense in which a class or ordered
series can be said to comprise terms which are members of it on the
other.
Before I pass to this question, however, I must explain one further
point in what I mean by saying that when two bodies are in contact the
outer surface or side of one touches the outer surface or side of the
other. If the outer surfaces are integral constituents of the bodies to
which they belong and are said to touch one another, then this must
mean something different from what is meant in saying that the two
bodies touch one another. A surface is not something which has an out-
side and an inside, and we cannot say of surfaces that the outside of the
one touches the outside of the other, as we do of bodies. Further, it
seems evident that no surface can be “next to” another surface. We
should not know what was meant by saying that this surface was next to
that one. On the other hand, if two surfaces are separated, then there is
no sense in saying that they are in contact or that they touch. Thus if
they are in contact they can be neither separated nor next to one
another. Consequently we must say, I think, that they coincide.
This is a statement about the positions of the surfaces in question. To
say of two surfaces which are integral constituents of real things that they
coincide or are in the same place sounds like a statement that two inte-
gral constituents | 56 of bodies interpenetrate. And this is likely to make
one think that there is something wrong somewhere. But I think this
would result from some misunderstanding of what can be meant by say-
ing that two surfaces are in the same place. It clearly cannot mean that
two surfaces interpenetrate, since there is no sense in speaking of a pene-
tration of a surface by anything (unless it might be in speaking of pene-
tration of a surface from one of its ends, – which could obviously have
nothing to do with the case we are considering). I fancy, however, that
it would also, and for similar reasons, be absurd to say of two surfaces
that they excluded one another. On the other hand it seems plain that
the side of a body is somewhere; and that when two bodies are in con-
tact the side of the one is where the side of the other is. The difficulty,
if there is one, is in seeing what the “is somewhere” means in such a
connection.
When we say of anything that it “is somewhere” we generally have
in mind the sort of thing that is meant in saying that a body is some-
where. When we say that the side of a body is somewhere we must
mean something rather different; although the “somewhere” of a side or
surface must obviously be connected in one way or another with the
“somewhere” of a body.
The place of an outer surface cannot be a place in itself, so to speak.
We might say that the place of the side of a body is the edge of the
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place of the body. In this way it is as inconceivable without the place of
a body as the side of a body is inconceivable without something of
which it is the side. It is not a place which anything capable of being a
thing by itself could conceivably occupy.
On the other hand it is the same place which may be thought of
either as the edge of the place of a body in one direction or as the edge
of the place of a body in another direction; or again, as the median of
the place of a body which includes it. The same place may thus be at
one time the | 57 place where an outer surface is, and at another time
the place where an inner surface is. (It would obviously be just as absurd
to try to think of the place where an inner surface is without thinking of
the place of some body which includes it, as it is to try to think of the
place of the side of a body without thinking of the place of the body.)
There is a certain difference in what is meant by saying that a surface is
there, according as we speak of an outer surface of a body in one direc-
tion, or of an outer surface of a body in another direction, or of an inner
surface. The difference, however, is not in the meaning of “there”, but
rather in the way in which the surface in question is there. The expres-
sion “way” in such connections is vague, but I cannot think of any that
is much more precise. It is tempting to say that the difference between
the way in which an outer surface (in either direction) can be at the
place in question on the one hand, and the way in which an inner sur-
face can be there on the other is some sort of difference in the com-
pleteness of its being there. If a surface is at the place only as the side of
a body which extends from there in one direction, then it is always pos-
sible for something to be there as the side of a body which extends in
another direction. If an inner surface is at that place, however, then it is
there in every way in which it is possible for anything to be there.
The reference to differences in the “completeness of a surface’s being
at a place” may seem objectionable. If it is there at all, it may be said,
then it must be completely there; and to speak of anything as being “in-
completely at that place” has no meaning. I do not wish to minimise the
difficulties connected with this way of speaking. But I think they are dif-
ficulties about the choice of language, and do not constitute any funda-
mental objection to the point I wish to make.
The “differences in completeness” which I have in mind are con-
nected with what I should like to call “differences in | 58 completeness”
or even “quantitative differences” in the surfaces themselves. (By this I
do not mean, of course, any quantitative differences in the two dimen-
sional areas of the surfaces). It might be said that the connection of an
outer surface with the body to which it belonged was in a sense less than
that of an inner surface would be, simply because the outer surface was
connected with or belonged to the body “only on one side”, so to
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speak, whereas an inner surface, being essentially included in a body,
would belong to the body “on both its sides”. To speak in this way of
differences of more and less in a surface’s belonging to a body is likely to
be misleading, since it may suggest that one and the same surface could
partly belong to a body and partly not belong to it. But in so far as a
surface does not belong to a body it is not a surface at all; (at any rate it
is not the sort of surface which we call a bodily surface. I have not dis-
cussed the question whether there are purely spatial surfaces which are
not bodily surfaces, and what, if there are such, their differences from
bodily surfaces may be. I do not see that it is necessary to do so in the
present connection.) As a surface it is essentially “of a body”. Its connec-
tion with the body is not only necessary to its existence, it is also part of
what the surface is. And any reduction in its connection with the body
must be a reduction in it as a surface.
Here again I am aware that my language is unhappy. To suggest with
regard to anything that it is its connection with something else seems to
be reminiscent of “aspects”, “perspectives”, “identity in difference”, and
so on. But I do not think my contention has anything to do with the
views which have made such expressions familiar. What I want to sug-
gest is that a surface is not something which has a relation to a body; or
at any rate that it is misleading to | 59 put it in this way. It cannot prop-
erly be described as the bearer of a relation “in” which it “stands” to the
body. It is better to say that it is itself something relative and essentially
belongs to the body. But this does not mean that it is identical with that
to which it “belongs”. There are perhaps no terms which have been
used with more confusion in philosophy than the terms “relative” and
“absolute”. I think that the confusion has been heightened, particularly
in recent times, by the tendency apparent in some writings to take the
so-called “relations of comparison” as the fundamental type of all rela-
tions. But to a large extent this tendency is supported by common lan-
guage, and particularly by the common usage of such terms as “relative”
and “relatively”. If it be said that “size is relative” one of the things that
this means is that statements as to the size of anything are statements of
comparison, – that they are statements that the things in question are lar-
ger than or smaller than or equal to something else. And much the same
can be said, I think, regarding the majority of statements to the effect
that some conception or other is a “relative conception”. I hope I need
hardly remark that this is not at all the sense of my statement that a sur-
face is something relative. And perhaps there is no excuse for my using
language in a way so contrary to the ordinary usage. But I know of no
other expression which will suggest at all what I mean by saying that a
surface is essentially “of something” without being identical with it and
without being a quality or property of it. It seems to me better to say
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that a surface is itself something relative rather than to say that a surface
is “essentially connected with” something else, chiefly because the type
of “connection” to which we should wish to refer by such an expression
would be just what we call “being a surface”. The phrase “essential con-
nection” is vague and is more likely to suggest something | 60 of a quite
different sort, such as what is meant when we say that two properties are
essentially connected in something if they mutually imply one another.
Whether or not there is an “essential connection” of this sort between a
surface and that of which it is a surface, – and perhaps there is, – at any
rate this is not what I am speaking of when I say that a surface is some-
thing which is itself relative. Finally, I say that it is better to say that a
surface is itself something relative than to suggest that it is its connection
to something else, since the latter statement might be taken to imply that
a surface is “a relation”. I have said already that I do not wish to say this.
I should agree that there is no justification for speaking of a relation
unless we can say that it is “had” by something “to” something else.
And one of the things I am most anxious to deny is that a surface, in the
sense of “integral surface”, is a relation which one body has to another.
It is partly for such reasons that I suggest that we cannot say that the
connection of an outer surface with a body is less than the connection of
an inner surface (of the same area) unless we mean that the surface itself
is less. I have suggested that this might be called a “quantitative differ-
ence” between the surfaces, although it is obvious that the term “quanti-
tative” would have a derivative meaning in this connection and could
not be taken to mean that the surfaces were of different sizes. It would
refer simply to a difference in the measure in which a surface was some-
thing relative, or, in other words, of the measure in which it was a sur-
face. I say that this is a derivative sense of “quantitative” since it seems
to me that the “quantity” of a surface (which in this connection, let me
repeat, does not mean its two dimensional area) does stand in a definite
relation to the extensive quantity of something else. The question of
what this | 61 relation is is one which I should prefer not to raise in this
place, and I hope there is no need for me to do so. This quantitative dif-
ference of surfaces is, I think, the kind of difference which Brentano
called a difference in the “plerosis” of surfaces.6 In this terminology we
might say that an inner surface was a surface in complete plerosis,
whereas an outer surface would be a surface in half plerosis. Brentano
used the expression “differences of plerosis”, however, to refer not only
to what I have been calling quantitative differences of surfaces, but also
to the difference between a “right hand” outer surface and a “left hand”
6. Compare Psychologie, II‹.› Band (Leipzig 1925) p. 261, also Kategorienlehre, p. 171.
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outer surface. I think it is useful to have such a common term for both
these sorts of difference, since it helps to emphasise certain of the most
important features of that difference which I have called a quantitative
one. If we do use this terminology, however, it will be necessary to
emphasise that certain differences in plerosis are differences of quantity
or “completeness”, whereas others are not.
Now I have said that this difference in quantity between surfaces is
connected with what I have called a difference in the completeness of a
surface’s being at a given place. The objections mentioned to any such
expression are justified against what would probably be the most natural
interpretation of it. It is nonsense to say of a surface that it might remain
unchanged as a surface and yet be either more completely or less com-
pletely where it is, – at any rate if the surface is supposed to be the sur-
face of a resting body in each case. But it is not obvious that it is
nonsense to say that another surface might have been more completely
at this place than this | 62 surface is, – to say, for instance, that if there
were an inner surface where this outer surface is, it would be more com-
pletely there than the outer surface is. If in fact this i‹s› not nonsense,
then that is because the question of what we mean by saying that a sur-
face, in distinction from a body, is at a place, is largely answered when
we know what is meant by a surface in distinction from a body at all;
and further, because one surface may be quantitatively less than another.
I will try to explain this.
I do not wish to raise the question of what is meant by a body’s being
at a place. I am concerned simply with the distinction between a sur-
face’s being at a place and a body’s being at a place. In order to know
what is meant by a surface’s being at a place one must know what is
meant by a body’s being at a place. But I am simply going to assume
that this is known. I say then that the distinction between the location7
of the surface and the location of that of which it is a surface is given as
soon as we have distinguished the surface from that to which it belongs
at all. This seems just as obviously true as it is that the distinction
between the location of one part having volume and the location of
another part having volume (in the same body) is given as soon as we
have distinguished between the one part and the other, – although of
course the location of a surface is something rather different from the
location of a part having volume, just as the distinction of a surface from
that of which it is a surface is different from the distinction of one part
having volume from another. This may seem so trivial as to be hardly
7. I want to use “the location of a surface” to mean the same as “a surface’s being at a
place”.
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any explanation at all. But I cannot see that very much more in the way
of explanation of this distinction is needed. | 63
I have said that surfaces may belong to bodies in different ways, or, in
other words, that they may be surfaces in different plerosis. I have just
been speaking of the distinction between a surface and that to which it
belongs, as far as this is relevant to what we mean by a surface’s being at
a place. And it is fairly clear that where surfaces are of different plerosis
this distinction will be of a slightly different sort. This is clearest if we
compare an inner surface with an outer surface in this respect. Suppose,
for instance, that a body expands whilst its centre remains fixed. Then
when it has expanded it will have an inner surface at the place at which
one of its outer surfaces was before. But the inner surface’s being at that
place will differ from the outer surface’s being at that place, and the dif-
ference will be a consequence of the difference in plerosis or the quanti-
tative difference of the surfaces. A surface is a surface at all only in its
connection with its body, and it is only in its connection with its body,
or only as a surface of its body, that it can be anywhere. This peculiar
“relativity” of a surface involves a corresponding “relativity” of its loca-
tion. The connection of an outer surface with its body does not make it
possible for the surface to be at the place where it is “from both sides”,
so to speak. Its location is “of” or “belongs to” the location of the body.
And its location “belongs to” the location of its body in a different
way from that in which the location of an inner surface does. If the
body is continuous on both sides of the place in question and does not
merely have an outer surface there, then there is an inner surface
which is at that place “from both sides”. The surface’s being at that
place “belongs to” or is “of” the location of the body at a place which
includes that place. (It includes it, of course, not in the way in which
one area may include another, but in the way in which anything hav-
ing volume may include an inner surface.) I have suggested that | 64
the relation of the location of a surface to the location of its body is
the same as the relation of the surface to the body (though I have also
said that the expression “relation of a surface to its body” is likely to
be misleading). And for this reason I have suggested that the inner sur-
face’s being at that place is more complete than the outer surface’s
being at that place could be.
I introduced this discussion of the completeness of a surface’s being at
a given place in order to try to make clearer what is meant by the coin-
cidence of the outer surfaces of two bodies in contact. I said that part of
what this means is that a side of the one body is where a side of the
other body is. It seemed, however, that there might be an objection to say-
ing this if one were going to hold that the side of a body were something real
and integral to it, since the sides or outer surfaces of the two bodies could
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not be identical and could not therefore be said to be in the same place. I
suggested that this objection could be based only on a misunderstanding of
what is meant by a surface’s being at a place. I have tried to show in some
measure what this does mean. And I hope it is clear from what I have said
that if we speak of two surfaces as being in the same place we mean some-
thing very different from what would be meant by saying that two bodies
were in the same place. If so much is clear, then the fact that it is impossible
for two bodies to be in the same place is largely irrelevant to the question
whether two surfaces can be at the same place.
The mere removal of this objection does not show positively that two
surfaces can be at the same place, of course. But I think that what has
been said in the course of the discussion does do something to show that
they can. The only surfaces which come in question are outer surfaces,
and outer surfaces of which one is a surface in the opposite direction
or | 65 in opposite plerosis to the other. Now if an inner surface might
have been at the place where one of these outer surfaces is, and if the
outer surface is less completely at that place than an inner surface would
be, then whilst the outer surface is there it should be possible for some-
thing else to be at that place in a way that is complementary, so to speak,
to the way in which this outer surface is there. It would not be comple-
mentary to the surface or to its location, since it would not make the
location of the outer surface any more nearly that of an inner surface
than it would otherwise be. But it would be complementary as far as the
“filling” of the place was concerned. The “something else” which might
thus be at the place of the outer surface first mentioned would have to
be a surface itself, of course. For the place of which we are speaking
cannot be the place of anything but a surface. And if this surface were
there only in the way complementary to that of the first mentioned sur-
face, it would obviously have to be an outer surface. It would then be as
impossible to say of the two surfaces that they were separated or in any
sense at different places as it would be to say of an inner surface that it
contained part-surfaces at different places. On the other hand, their coin-
cidence at that place would be something very different from the loca-
tion of an inner surface at that place. And this would be largely a
consequence of the fact that the location of each of the outer surfaces
there “belonged to” the location of a different body.
I do not wish to say anything more at this juncture about the outer
surfaces of bodies in contact, though it is a matter that will be found to
be fundamental to many of the questions I have to discuss later. I main-
tain that there is no objection to saying that two surfaces can be in the
same place; and I suggest that the fact that outer surfaces are quantita-
tively less, or of less complete plerosis, than inner surfaces makes | 66 it
positively clear that they can. I think therefore that there is no objection
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to saying that when two bodies are in contact a side of the one coincides
with a side of the other. I have gone into this discussion of contact partly
to remove a possible objection to the view that the outer surfaces of
bodies are real and integral to the bodies to which they belong. But I
have also had another reason. My contention has been that the contact
of different bodies cannot be analysed simply in terms of intersecting vol-
umes. My discussion of coincidence has done nothing to show that it
cannot, but has rather proceeded on the assumption that it cannot. But
since I had contended that no analysis could be adequate that did not
recognise integral surfaces, I felt that I ought to try to indicate the sort
of statement that could be made in terms of integral surfaces. My general
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